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Abstract
Recent changes in the English National Health Service (NHS) have introduced new com-
plexities into the accountability arrangements for healthcare services. This commentary 
describes how the new organizational structures have challenged the traditional centralized 
accountability structures by creating a more dispersed system of governance for local health-
care commissioners. It sets the context of discussions about accountability in the UK NHS 
and then describes the key changes in England following the implementation of the NHS 
reforms in April 2013. The commentary concludes that while there is increased complexity 
of accountability within a more decentralized and fragmented healthcare system, the govern-
ment’s goal of achieving increased local autonomy and greater control by general practitioners 
(GPs) will probably not be realized. In particular, the system will continue to have strongly 
centralized aspects, with increased regulation and central political responsibility.
Résumé
De récents changements dans le système de santé NHS, au Royaume-Uni, ont ajouté un 
niveau de complexité dans les arrangements de l’obligation de rendre compte pour les services 
de santé. Ce commentaire décrit comment les nouvelles structures organisationnelles mettent 
au défi les structures centralisées traditionnelles de l’obligation de rendre compte, et ce, en 
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créant un système de gouvernance plus dispersé pour les commissaires locaux des services de 
santé. Il présente le contexte des discussions sur l’obligation de rendre compte dans le NHS et 
décrit les principaux changements en Angleterre, qui ont suivi la mise en œuvre des réformes 
du NHS, en avril 2013. En guise de conclusion, le commentaire indique que bien qu’il y ait 
une hausse du niveau de complexité pour l’obligation de rendre compte, au sein d’un système 
de santé plus fragmenté et décentralisé, l’objectif du gouvernement visant à atteindre une plus 
grande autonomie au niveau local et un plus grand contrôle des médecins ne se réalisera prob-
ablement jamais. En particulier, il continuera d’y avoir de forts aspects centralisateurs ainsi 
qu’un accroissement de la réglementation et des responsabilités politiques centrales.
T
The National Health Service (NHS) of the UK is generally described as a “command and control” system that provides the context for accountability within the NHS. Budgets and strategic policy are set centrally by the government 
and Department of Health (DoH) and administered locally by NHS organizations with 
delegated powers, but with direct lines of accountability to the DoH, albeit mediated through 
central and regional administrative structures. The situation is more complex, however, than 
the “command and control” model would suggest. Since 1948 the balance between central and 
local control and autonomy has fluctuated with successive governments, and now also includes 
diversity between devolved governments in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales (Exworthy 
et al. 1999; Peckham et al. 2008). The NHS also embodies both diversity between devolved 
political systems and uniformity across the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, the NHS 
in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland is under the control of the devolved authorities over-
seen by the territorial parliaments of Wales and Scotland and the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
However, the national (UK) character of the health service is reinforced by centralized fund-
ing and an emphasis on shared values such as equitable access, universality, free access and 
comprehensiveness, as well as by professional conformity and common standards or condi-
tions of service. An additional complexity is that the NHS is formed of a series of local health 
services (Powell 1998) responding to local needs and conditions and working in partnership 
with other local organizations (Exworthy and Peckham 1998). There is, therefore, a ten-
sion between the requirement for central accountability for the NHS and the need for local 
accountability to reflect local contextual issues. There has also been a shift in the way account-
ability within the NHS is developing, from a centralized bureaucratic governance structure to 
one where there is greater decentralization of control over inputs and processes but an increas-
ing centralization of outcome measures through performance targets and regulation (Peckham 
et al. 2005, 2008).
Some aspects of healthcare demonstrate both centralist and decentralist approaches – 
such as utilizing national frameworks to develop local innovative solutions and supporting 
changes in the workforce. While the UK retains significant elements of a centrally coordinated 
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system, political devolution and changes in the organization of health services, in England in 
particular, have resulted in an increasingly complex framework for the accountability of UK 
health services. These are described in more detail in this commentary.
Changing Contexts of Accountability in the NHS: The New English System
On coming to power in 2010, the coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal 
Democrats embarked on a major reorganization of the English NHS system, despite having 
initially promised “no more top-down reorganisations of the NHS” (Government of England 
2010):
The Government’s reforms will liberate professionals and providers from top-down 
control. This is the only way to secure the quality, innovation and productivity need-
ed to improve outcomes. We will give responsibility for commissioning and budgets 
to groups of GP [general practitioner] practices; and providers will be freed from 
government control to shape their services around the needs and choices of patients. 
Greater autonomy will be matched by increased accountability to patients and 
democratic legitimacy, with a transparent regime of economic regulation and quality 
inspection to hold providers to account for the results they deliver. (Department of 
Health 2010: para. 4.1)
The new English system shown in Figure 1 represents a substantial and radical overhaul 
of the NHS in England that affected almost every level of the service and was decidedly  
“top down.” 
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Prior to April 2013, primary care trusts (PCTs) held delegated responsibility for 85% of 
the NHS budget; they commissioned and contracted the majority of primary and second-
ary care for a defined geographical population and had responsibility for public health. PCTs 
had boards constituted of executive and non-executive directors and were held to account by 
a regional authority. Since April, no single organization holds budgets for all healthcare sec-
tors and public health. The principle of geographic populations has been retained, but clinical 
commissioning groups (CCGs) do not contract general medical services (GMS contracts  
are now commissioned by NHS England) or some specialist services and do not commission 
public health services (where responsibility lies with Public Health England and local  
government). CCGs are held to account by NHS England but also have to respond to their  
co-located local authority. The new structure has created a complex web of relationships.





of performance against centrally set criteria;
t UPDSFBUFBQMVSBMJTUNPEFMPGMPDBMQSPWJTJPO	%FQBSUNFOUPG)FBMUI

The changes themselves were extensive in scope, involving the removal of overall responsi-
bility for running the NHS from the DoH and handing it to a new arm’s-length body, NHS 
England (NHSE), which is also responsible for commissioning 40% of English health services 
(e.g., general practice, dental services, specialist services and some public health programs). 
Central accountability of the NHS to the government flows from the NHS mandate – a con-
tract between the DoH and NHSE that sets out the government’s requirements (see Box 1).
The mandate sets out the contractual obligation of NHSE to deliver healthcare and the 
areas that it will be accountable for to the DoH. It incorporates a mixture of specific govern-
ment policy objectives and a framework within which national and local NHSs are expected 
to operate. The secretary of state for health has specific duties set out in the Health and Social 
Care Act, 2012, including the promotion of a comprehensive health service, reducing inequali-
ties and having regard for the NHS Constitution. The secretary is accountable to Parliament. 
Responsibility (and accountability) for operational aspects of the English NHS have been 
delegated from the DoH to NHSE, which then holds local NHS organizations to account 
through the outcomes framework or through direct contractual mechanisms (e.g., for general 
practice or locally delivered specialist services). The NHS Constitution sets out a principle 
for the government to ensure that “there is always a clear and up-to-date statement of NHS 
accountability” and a transparent process of accountability that is clear to the public, patients 
and staff (Department of Health 2013).
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The statement emphasizes the importance of accountability to patients and the pub-
lic more generally, as well as outlining arrangements for organizational responsibility and 
accountability within the English health system. The actual degree of autonomy from the 
DoH that NHSE will enjoy is debatable. There is both formal oversight and a blurred dis-
tinction as to whether NHSE is answerable only to its board or whether it also responds to 
political pressure from the public or from the DoH and Parliament.
Alongside the creation of NHS England there has been some concentration of regula-
tory structures at a national level, with wider powers for the Care Quality Commission 
and Monitor as key regulators of NHS and healthcare providers in England. The National 
Institute for Health Care Excellence has also seen its guidance role significantly developed. 
The Mandate – at a glance
The mandate is structured around five key areas, which align with 
the NHS Outcomes Framework, as well as including additional 
direction on topics such as finance. (This is only a summary – see 
the Mandate for details.)
1. Preventing people from dying prematurely
We want England to become among the best in Europe at 
preventing ill-health, and providing better early diagnosis and 
treatment of conditions, such as cancer and heart disease, so that 








people stay in good health. 
2. Enhancing quality of life for people with long-term 
conditions
We want the NHS to be among the best in Europe in supporting 
people to manage ongoing physical and mental health conditions, 
such as diabetes and depression, so that people can experience a 







3. Helping people to recover from episodes of ill health 
or following injury
The Board is being asked to highlight the differences in quality and 
results between services across the country in order to share best 




involving local people in decision-making about services. 
4. Ensuring that people have a positive experience of 
care
The Board is being asked to make sure we experience better care, 
not just better treatment, particularly for older people and at the 
end of people’s lives. Objectives include:
t .FBTVSJOHBOEVOEFSTUBOEJOHIPXQFPQMFGFFMBCPVUUIFJSDBSF










5. Treating and caring for people in a safe environment 
and protecting them from avoidable harm
The Board is being asked to continue to reduce the number of 
incidents of avoidable harm and make progress towards embedding 
a culture of patient safety through improved reporting of incidents.
6. Freeing the NHS to innovate







maintaining quality, through QUIPP.
7. The broader role of the NHS in society
We want the Board to promote and support participation by NHS 
organizations and NHS patients in research, to improve patient 
outcomes and to contribute to economic growth. The Board must 
also seek to make partnership working a success.
8. Finance
The Board’s revenue budget for 2013-14 is £95.6 billion. 
Its objective is to ensure good financial management and 
improvements in value for money across the NHS.
BOX 1.  The NHS mandate
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It is responsible for the development of outcomes measures for the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework and also the Commissioning Outcomes Framework (Department of Health 
2012). The new NHS system has substantially increased the level of centralization, shifting 
powers and functions previously held by PCTs and regional strategic health authorities to 
enhanced national agencies.
Responsibility for commissioning the majority of services for a defined geographical 
population lies with the CCGs, which involve primary care physicians (GPs) working together 
with other local clinicians, managers and lay representatives. However, while emphasizing 
CCGs’ local freedom and accountability, the government has created a highly centralized 
accountability structure within which CCGs operate. CCGs had to go through a formal 
authorization process managed by NHS England to assess their fitness to be autonomous 
statutory organizations and sanction formal appointment processes for key board members. 
Standard constitutions have been developed by NHSE and the DoH, and CCGs are moni-
tored by NHSE through a new outcomes framework. Regulation is also provided by Monitor, 
an arm’s-length government body that was set up to regulate NHS Foundation Trusts and 
now has an expanded role as economic regulator of the new NHS system. Monitor’s respon-
sibilities include preventing anticompetitive behaviour, promoting integration, setting prices 
within the system and ensuring service continuity. This framework constitutes a fairly strong 
national accountability.
Similarly, the actual degree of autonomy of CCGs is also open to question. While policy 
highlights the “liberation” of professionals to make commissioning decisions, it is clear that 
“CCGs (unlike all previous manifestations of clinically led commissioning) will be statutory 
bodies with associated accountability and governance responsibilities. This will act to limit 
GPs’ ability to act quickly and autonomously ” (Checkland et al. 2012: 120). CCGs are sub-
ject to a complex web of accountability relationships. The strongest form of accountability is 
likely to be their accountability to NHSE, as this is backed by sanctions and subject to annual 
assessment. Furthermore, the currency of this accountability is clearly established, encompass-
ing fiscal accountability and program accountability for the CCG outcomes indicator set. The 
accountability to other external bodies is, by contrast, much weaker and less clearly defined, 
with CCGs simply required to “give an account” of how they have responded to the locally 
developed joint strategic plan but where there are no associated sanctions. Accountability to 
Monitor, as the national financial regulator, may be more formal because Monitor is apparent-
ly being empowered to enforce competition law, but how this principle will be applied remains 
unclear. More interestingly, other non-health regulators are now intervening within the health-
care sector, including the Office for Fair Trading and the Competition Commission – both of 
which have ruled on recent health service organizational changes. Accountability to the public 
is focused upon the relatively weak notion of “transparency,” with no associated sanctions. In 
addition, there are further layers of professional accountability to the local medical committee 
(the local manifestation of the UK General Medical Committee, which regulates professional 
medical practice). 
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Internal accountability relationships are similarly complex. Locally, CCGs are account-
able to their board, which consists of elected GP members, certain centrally authorized posts 
(including the chair and an accountable officer) and other appointed members, including 
two lay members. The CCG governing body is elected by and answerable to GP members. 
This status as a “membership” organization is highlighted as a key new and desirable feature 
of CCGs. However, it remains to be seen whether, for example, in the future, GP practices 
might try to act together to dismiss a governing body that was not performing as they would 
like. Furthermore, should the wishes of the CCG membership clash with the requirements 
of NHS England (as is entirely possible), it will be interesting to see how a governing body 
might resolve the ensuing conflict.
However, there is also oversight through new local authority subcommittees known as 
health and wellbeing boards (HWBs). Government policy places key importance on the role 
of the HWB as part of its aim to increase democratic legitimacy and accountability. HWBs 
are part of the local council’s statutory arrangements and provide strategic direction and pro-
mote health and social care integration (Department of Health 2010: para. 4.17). However, 
their accountability role is also seen as important:
The joint local leadership of CCGs and local authorities through the health and well-
being board will be at the heart of this new health and social care system. … They 
will enable greater local democratic legitimacy of commissioning decisions, and pro-
vide an opportunity for challenge, discussion and the involvement of local representa-
tives. (Department of Health 2011: 15)
CCGs have a representative on the HWB and are expected to set their own priorities in 
response to the strategic direction set by their local HWB. It is not clear how this relation-
ship will evolve or what influence local authorities will have over local health services plan-
ning despite this statutory strategic role, as this is a new area of responsibility. CCGs are 
also required to be responsive to local populations, with responsibilities for consulting with 
patients and the public. Despite the rhetoric of increased localness and decentralized decision-
making, accountability is, as suggested earlier, dispersed between central and local accountabil-
ity and between formal and less formal accountabilities (Checkland et al. 2013). 
Tensions between Central and Local Accountability in the New English NHS
Despite government policy promoting a more decentralized NHS structure and commission-
ing, it is hard to see how a system funded from central taxation can successfully be entirely 
removed from the overview of the central political system. While it is possible to argue the 
theoretical distinctions between developing policy (a political responsibility) and delivering 
healthcare (a management responsibility), distinctions between policy formation and policy 
implementation are, in reality, hard to make (Hill and Hupe 2002). There has also been a 
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shift towards a decentralization of responsibility for processes and service delivery, but within 
very clear, centrally defined goals and outcomes to be achieved (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; 
Peckham et al. 2008). In addition, any local change of NHS services can potentially raise 
national political concerns because of the nature of the UK parliamentary system and the fact 
that funding comes from general taxation, an issue firmly in the jurisdiction of Parliament. 
Current debates about the national payment-by-results (PBR) tariffs are an example of how 
the concerns and decisions at a local level are constrained by nationally set tariffs ( Jones 
2012). Questions are also being asked about the role of resource allocation models used with-
in the NHS (Buck and Dixon 2013). 
Responsibility for quality of care is another contentious area within this more fragmented 
governance system. Recent national concerns about accident and emergency (A&E) attend-
ances, poor performance in hospitals and even individual patient care issues can easily become 
national political concerns (Francis 2013). These national issues highlight the varying respon-
sibilities of, and relationships among, national policy makers, regulators and local CCGs and 
providers. 
The introduction of NHSE and CCGs was aimed at increasing the autonomy of the 
NHS and GPs’ leverage over the system. Instead, it has created a more fragmented and com-
plex commissioning and service delivery system – introducing complexities to accountability 
structures and new forms of organizational accountability that operate alongside existing 
funding and professional accountability structures. While aspects of the NHS have been 
decentralized, there are continuing central accountability structures that, in a more diversified 
and fragmented system, create a context that ultimately favours stronger centralized accounta-
bility. Alongside these tensions are increasing tensions between a move towards more competi-
tion and market approaches to service provision and policies that stress greater integration and 
a desire in many local areas to develop and manage services. Traditionally within the NHS, 
central accountability has remained predominant; as yet, there is little to suggest that this situ-
ation will change in the future.
Correspondence may be directed to: Stephen Peckham, Director, Centre for Health Services Studies, 
University of Kent, George Allen Wing, Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF; tel.: +44 (0)1227-827645; 
e-mail: s.peckham@kent.ac.uk.
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